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Figure 1. Giorgione, Tempest (Accademia, Venice).
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here is such a thing as the visual intellect. It is a curiously
nonverbal power of the mind to which literary idea and verbalization may append themselves sometimes appropriately
and helpfully. We are aware of its functioning whenever we attend to
sheer image without the need for translating it into words, without
even any especial interest in whether a word to name the image exists .
However, the visual image does not exist in a vacuum, nor does the
visual intellect live apart from other activities of the human mind
which inform it and which, in turn, it informs. The occasional purist
who makes a small tease over the purity of his forms is welcome to
whatever pride he may feel in his aesthetic virginity. Thin-blooded explications of narrowly formal relationships are as tedious and as short
of the mark as are heavy-handed crudities about the moral purposes of
art.
Notoriously on the artist's part, there has been a persistent failure of
interest in the presentations of art historians and aestheticians. It may
be true , and probably is, that a thoughtful historian and a perceptive
aesthetician may speak to the ultimate concerns of an artist's activity.
But the sense that verbalization sometimes contrives a mausoleum, a
monumental enshrinement of the irrelevant, derives from the fact that
the urgent operations of the visual intellect are directed first and
foremost below or beyond the level of language . Superb literary
visualizations such as one finds in a great poet are not paintings except
metaphorically. Nor can they guarantee the merit of an actual painting when translated into one. Interest in the literary program of a
Renaissance painting must justify itself on grounds other than that
herein one will locate the essential secret of the artist 's activity. What
survives as still exciting in a Renaissance program painting is hardly the
passage from Ovid which it may illustrate, but the qualities of visual
logic and invention operating apart from, although in collaboration
with, the presumed text. The literary text, when in fact it can be
established, is surely worth knowing. But such information cannot
strangle our perception of the far more vital matter, which is the
artist 's power in visual invention.
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The conditions of a commission, stipulations that are iconographic
or commercial, the historical and social ambient, the fund of talk or
writing available to him, autobiographical detail concerning murders,
madness, numbers of children, love affairs and religious conversions-are all relevant in establishing the real pressures under which
an artist may in fact work. But the painter, sculptor, or photographer
knows he really is one when outside the reach of such pressures, a
sharply and critically directed visualization brings to him the sense of
having understood both interior and exterior of the object under examination, or of tho:: new visual reality whose logic and eloquence he
has just invented out of pigment or stone.
These are indeed images of understanding. The visual intellect of an
El Greco, for example, betrays itself whatever the verbalizable nature
of the subject (Pentecost or the portrait of a man whose biography we
can annotate) . Crudely we call this his "style"; more crudely we
reduce it to technical mannerisms in the drawing of elongations or the
rendition of light. Ambiguously, we speak of "how he sees things."
(One wonders what this means.) Ambitiously, we refer to his
''vision.'' None of these quite satisfies the firs! wonder; what a strange
thing is art, is man, that through the one, the visual intellect can
render a moving account of the other. What we recognize as El Greco
is the special way in which a given mind makes images of its
understanding.
This may be so dramatically with El Greco or with Paul Klee. But
more quietly it holds also for Degas and Chardin. In each case , one
recognizes a special bent of the mind in how each understands experience as visual. This special mind set is always part of the real content of the painting. It is at least possible, as with Paul Klee , for example, that sometimes it is the only real content. The poor angel , the letter Z, the little room in Venice are the exterior images that convey
what they all have in common, a quality of mind difficult to define
verbally but identifiable nonetheless. Perhaps there is no mystery in
the Giorgione Tempest (Fig. 1), a title tacked on for identification only and justifiable as providing less of a disservice than any other. What
his figures are doing in his landscape accords little with normative expectations. Perhaps some day a literary program for it will be
discovered. But Vasari threw up his hands at the hope of ever finding
meaning in much of Giorgione' s work: "And I for my part have never
been able to understand his figures nor, for all my asking, have I ever
found anyone who does." What one knows for a certainty, standing
before this painting, is an entranced lyricism communicated through
sheer visual sensibility, so powerful that one does not turn away from
it unmoved or thereafter unmarked. Perhaps this is the content, the
real subject matter of the painting. In any case, it is the only one we
know for certain .

S

uch a reading accords with how the modern mind tends to approach art and would invite little reservation if the painting
had been done at any time within the last hundred years . Yet
the historian has understandable misgivings. He may argue that the
notion that painting can restrict itself, like music, to the evocation of
general states of feeling is plausible enough for much of Gauguin and
Published by SURFACE, 1981
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most of Kandinsky. But he may think it farfetched, at least at the
outset of the investigation, to hold that it will apply back four hundred years to Giorgione. He would like a document either from
Giorgione , or from someone close to him, saying explicitly that this is
what the man was doing. Or he would like a prior model so at least an
influence can be somewhere assumed. Or, perhaps, he might want to
know if we can offer him a number of other examples, sufficient to
show that a practice of this sort can be claimed as one of the historical
perspectives of early sixteenth-century art.
It is commonly assumed of a Renaissance painting when figures are
shown, as they here are, engaged in an activity of some kind, that the
matter can be reduced to the visualization of a literary idea. It is
customary to suppose, given Giorgione 's historical context, that the
painting represents an episode in some narrative, or an allegory of
some kind. If neither the narrative nor the allegory can be identified,
one can suppose it is a private matter known to the painter and his circle . Vasari takes an even more simple view. He supposes that
Giorgione wanted to show, in his Fondaco frescoes, how adept he was
in drawing figures according to his own fancy. There is no word about
the nature of this fancy other than the complaint that no one
recognizable is represented. The high Renaissance seems for the
historian an unlikely moment for the modern notion that figures
engaged in an activity present nothing beyond a brooding lyrical sensibility.
Shall we then surrender our reading? There seems no reason to . For
there is a distinction between making up something that does not exist
(a fault not unknown in the history of history) and recognizing
something that is in fact there . The historian does not-(or, at least,
he should not)-deny the lyricism of this Giorgione painting nor the
fact that, like music , it evokes a general state of feeling. He simply
wants , in addition, a more normative historical reading that would
make it, like other Renaissance paintings of its kind-narrative or
allegorical or in some fashion founded on literary idea. We reach then
to a clear demarcation of interest. The modern mind does not require
of any painting, Renaissance or recent, that it transmit a literary idea.
The historian, however, is not privileged to forego his search for it in a
Renaissance painting. If he finds something illuminating, he will add
to our modern understanding. But he cannot invalidate our modern
understanding simply on the grounds of its modernity.
The argument here set forth is a general one. Its immediate focus is
upon the separateness of two modes of reading: (1) reading out of the
painting from its historical context and (2) reading into the painting
from our modern approach to works of art. The claim, to begin with,
is that the two need not be confused and that each has its validity. But
clearly the matter does not end there; for the moment we formalize
the two, implicitly there is the question of the relationship between
them. If a modern reading has any power worth our attention (whether
the modern reading is a formal ism like Freudianism or Marxism or
structuralism, or a mute sense of expectation about what one is liable
to think or feel before a work of art), then one has to suppose that it
inheres in the art per se; that it has always been a perspective of the
art; and that accidents of history have attuned our consciousness of it
more sharply, more overtly now than in the past.
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For our case in point, the Giorgione painting commonly known as
the Tempest, we have to inquire then whether our modern nonverbal
(or, at least, nonnarrative) view has not always been an important
perspective of its meaning, perhaps even its only perspective. If we
press this strongly, then we will come up with a far more subtle complex of aesthetic expectation for late Renaissance art than many had
once thought historically licit. Confronted with a bewildering array of
possible literary programs proposed for the painting, opinion has
begun quietly to shift. It is no longer so very unconventional to suggest that Giorgione was dealing with mind states, with a nonnarrative
figuring forth of images, with a sensibility that sought (and still seeks)
to evade language, with the operations, in short, of what has been
posited in this paper as the visual intellect.

T

he position has ramifications beyond what seems, perhaps too
readily, to have been disposed of. But before proceeding, it
would be well to pause for another example. It is a truism
that the Renaissance artist was engrossed in the conquest of reality, in
the study of anatomy and perspective, in a struggle to master the real
structure of an objectively existing world. Alfred North Whitehead
justly accords to the Renaissance artist a position among the founders
of the modern scientific mentality. Now a problem arises in
Renaissance self-portraiture that has to do with the reversal of an image in a mirror. In particular, hands are a nuisance, not only because
what one is doing with one's right hand will be seen as being done
with the left, but because, when the hands are clasped together, for
example, psychologically there still has to be the right sort of' 'feel'' as
to which hand is which. Albrecht Durer was a Renaissance painter
more particularly dedicated to the science of painting, to an orderly
and meticulous study of "the real." In the Prado self-portrait (1498;
Fig. 2), where he presents himself elegantly as a gentleman, a lack of
ease still betrays itself in the drawing of the hands. No doubt there is
strain there. One can suppose this a failure to develop an effective
solution to a technical problem. The thumbs, in particular, may not
convince as entirely naturalistic, and Durer, it is supposed, was interested in getting things right.l
However, there is a mode of aesthetic reconciliation, although it is
doubtful that a blunt statement of it will satisfy an art historian or
even that it would with certainty have satisfied Durer. We can accept
the hands and ask how they contribute, just as they are, to the visual
reading of character (which is, after all, the essence of the question) .
The Durer hands, by virtue of their tight, awkward strain, contribute
for the modern observer not only an allowable but a most gratefully
accepted contradiction to the elegance of the man. It is a dissonance,
to be sure, but a well-placed one, and it has the look of truth about it.
What comes readily to us is the supposition that ''to draw well does
not mean to draw correctly." This was said by Jawlensky, a German
expressionist; but it could have been said by nearly any artist in the last
hundred years, so common is this point of view. In the modern expectation, the strain of the hands, the distortion of the thumbs, speaks to
an inner tension which we take as a natural truth rather than as a fault
in naturalistic drawing. It is idle to ask whether Durer had our reading
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1. Twenty years later this Durer-like
clasp of the hands reappears most
elegantly drawn in Pontormo's ponrait
of Cosimo the Elder. Here the issue is
not a realistic rendition of an image
reversal in mirror self-ponraiture, but
the making of a memorial icon of a man
many years dead.
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Figure 2. Durer; SelfPortrait (Prado, Madrid).
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Figure 3. Donacello, Lo Zuccone (Museum of the Duomo, Florence).
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in mind or whether he would have drawn the hands more gracefully
had he been able. It is also idle to note that Diirer was not a member
of the modern middle class with its theology of inner personal tension
universalized into the ultimate and all-pervasive condition of man .
The point is that the dissonance exists . We can look at the thumbs only (as sensible as an elbow or a left earlobe view) and decide that the
drawing is infelicitous. Or we can look at the whole painting, at what
the visual intellect tells us is the character of the man , and find that
the hands are an inspired dissonance , humanizing and enriching the
presentation.

H

ere and in many other examples it is possible, and
sometimes it is certain, that we make a shift in historical
perspective. The visual intellect does not exist apart from
real people living, as all must, mainly in their own history. The signals
sent and received across centuries can hardly be expected to remain
constant in meaning. We observe the historian's strictures and proceed
with proper caution in legitimating shifts in modes of vision and hence
in visual meaning. But we cannot countenance reading them out of
the record as irrelevant and misleading.
The insistence that we understand the past only as the past
understood itself is as much a modern mode of thought (or a modern
mysticism) as is the eagerness to uncover a new psychology wherever
one looks. The cult of authenticity in baroque musical practice is
matched in simplemindedness only by the cult of correctness in seeking for iconographies in medieval and Renaissance art. Fact is one
thing, interpretation another. The thumbs in the Di.irer self-portrait
are not gracefully drawn; the literary idea for the Giorgone Tempest, if
it ever existed, is not now known and can only be conjectured. So far,
so fair. But in what we are authorized to make of this, the living have
privileges and responsibilities as well as the dead .
What it comes to is that the modern imagination has its rights. We
have no intention of bowing before historical fact and putting arms
back on the Venus de Milo merely because we know that the Greeks,
whatever their sexual proclivities, hardly imagined the goddess of love
without them. (The case is no better if we suppose her not a goddess
but a handsome woman dropping her clothes and about to enter a
bath.) Nor would the Greeks have insulted Athena by maintaining a
ruin in her honor. Her temple, the Parthenon in Athens, has been
eroded by wind, stained by splotches that time has worked out of the
stone, and once, when used as an ammunition dump in a war between
the Venetians and the Turks, it was blown up . Some of its appeal surely derives from the modern and romantic awe before so noble a
wonder that has withstood both the enmity of time and the idiocy of
man. We do not raze the ruin of the Parthenon to replace it correctly
with a clean architectural perfection and one, moreover , with painted
statues .
Donatello's Lo Zuccone (so-called) has been removed from its perch
some sixty to seventy feet above street level and placed in the Museum
of the Duomo in Florence, secure against further deterioration (Figs . 3
and 4). We now meet it as a work by Donatello and two other
unacknowledged artists-time and resetting. For as we now must see
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it, time-beaten and at eye level, the distortions introduced by both
have turned it into what might at first glance pass for a powerful example of early twentieth-century expressionism . It is not only that it
makes no sense to put it back where it belongs, on a perch where it can
scarcely be seen and where it will surely perish. The more pertinent
fact is that it looks good to us in the falsified way in which we now see
it-harsh, angular, distorted . We are used to seeing sculpture of this
sort; the visual intellect now accepts this readily and without overmuch
curiosity as to what still frustrates the scholar-namely whom
Donatello had intended to represent when he carved his ''pumpkin
head." 2 The scholar knows that from a Renaissance sculptor he has
reason to expect a definite answer (e.g., a person then living, or a

2. This figure was already known in the
Renaissance as " pumpkin head ," and
one suspects that much of what looks
good to us in its expressionistic stance
may well have looked good also to
Donatello's contemporaries. While I
mean to stress the very real difference
between Renaissance attitudes and our
own, in some particulars the matter can
be overstated.

Figure 4. Donatello, Lo Zuccone (detail).

figure out of history, or out of the Testaments or pagan myth, or some
specific allegorical conception) . But in the modern way of seeing, it is
sufficient to say that it is a man.

A

final example and, indeed , a critical one: the bias of a modern
mind as it affects the restorer, to whom, after all, is entrusted
the work of maintaining the art object in its despairing battle
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against time . What are the criteria of authenticity in determining how
one restores a painting? In fact, there are several and they conflict. The
choice that seems so reasonable is simply the one that happens to accord with the mode of thought current when the restoration is made,
and not necessarily the mode of thought that prevailed when the work
was originally done. The Giotto frescoes in Santa Croce in Florence are
a case in point (Figs . 5 and 6). One can restore by repainting damaged
areas to show the original condition of the work, or one can restore by
cleaning and allowing whatever has been lost to remain lost. The
nineteenth-cenrury restorer chose the first option (Fig. 5): for the taste
of the time, worshiping works of art as elegant and perfect productions, would scarcely tolerate empty patches of fresh plaster in the
middle of a fresco . Even sculpture was so treated, and the Praxiteles
Hermes and the Infant Dionysus was provided with a new left foot and
two new legs that had been lost in the original.
The modern restorer finds this obnoxious. He cleans back to the
point where only the hand of the master remains, and in the name of
authenticity he, and we, are ready to accept whatever strangeness this
procedure produces. The Giotto frescoes in Santa Croce can now be
seen rid of all corrective painting added by previous restorers (Fig. 6) .
Strips of empty wall replace the original wherever it has been lost; and
this entirely unauthentic emptiness winding through the fresco, intersecting figures and leaving bodies dismembered, now stands as
security that what remains is authentic. Two things can be said about
this. First, it is an excellent instance of fact worship to which the
modern mind is so prone. Completeness, perfection, elegance, have
no case before a hard-headed restorer asserting that what is, is. 3 Even
the tourist nods approvingly. There is no put-on here. He is shown
plainly the facts of the case . Secondly, though we may regret that a
wall cannot withstand time, it causes little discomfort to our postsurrealist, postabstractionist sensibility to accept from Giotto something
so unlikely as sections of bodies subsisting unjoined, imperviously
tolerating the arbitrary, irrelevant, and unnarural dematerializations
of vital parts of themselves into emptiness. The contemporary visual
intellect adjusts quite readily. A hundred years ago such an "authenticity'' would have been sheer outrage and anguish.
There are simply no unequivocal and indisputable criteria for asserting on basic ground , aesthetic or historical, that one mode of authenticity is utterly true and the other utterly false. What is acceptable as
the ' 'past' ' depends much upon what is found natural or agreeable or
at least tolerable in the present. It is surely necessary to know the past
"in its own terms" to whatever degree this is possible. It is equally
necessary to know our own mind about it. These are separate, though
related, matters with far-reaching implications for how we read a work
of art .

I

t is surely not licit to invent out of the heart of darkness whatever
we fancy as the meaning of a painting. But the stain of a living
mind is inevitably upon whatever it touches. It is equally impermissible , on evidence necessarily incomplete and often ambiguous,
to limit the angle of vision from which "the historical facts " dictate
that a painting be read. (Masaccio's Tn'b ute Money , for example, can-
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not be reduced to the issue of tax collecting.) A responsible scholarship
cautions us to live with a work of art within the limits of plausibility,
and to transgress, if we must, through the temptations of an informed
intellect rather than through an arrogance founded in ignorance.
Moreover, it is not evident that the present always understands itself
better than the future will. This holds for any moment once present
and now past. It is fair to say of a Renaissance painter that his interests
in some respects are very different from our own. To insist on reading
only out of our own perspectives is to insist upon a reading of ourselves
rather than of the work of art. It is true that an encounter with a work
of art becomes especially moving when it entails a moment of selfunderstanding. In the privacy of our affections we retain a special
place for a few works that have meant much to us. But the functions of
a work of art cannot be reduced solely to self-analysis, nor can its
meaning be restricted to true confessions from a chance observer. In so
doing we may neglect something from the past that falls outside the
immediacies of a modern interest, an otherness no longer in the
foreground of our attention. Upon occasion, it is an otherness in which
we discover value, a richness of a special kind no longer to be found
commonly in our own culture.
Somewhere we must find the balance between our regard for what
the past has to offer and our regard for our own interest in the offering. We cannot be put off with the admonition that the artist is expressing his own time and not ours. Nor need we genuflect before the
recently descended who carry tablets which tell them what, at any
given moment in history, an artist is restricted to expressing. It is a
truism that an artist's mind is formed within the context of his own
culture. It is also axiomatic that inspiration and insight work in their
own mysterious ways and that, of all people, an artist in particular is
liable to say, eloquently and clearly, more than he consciously may

Figure 5. Giotto, Funeral of St. Francis (Bardi Chapel, Santa Croce, Florence). Nineteenth-century restoration.
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know .
In any case, we cannot be driven back to that aberration of the firstyear graduate student-an appeal to the artist's intention. Intention is
a concept extraordinary in its complexity and hardly one that is always
firmly and thoroughly understood, either by those who do the intending or by those who construe the intention. Where we can say
something definite and understandable about it, it may turn out to be
significant for an understanding of a painting; or it may turn out to be
interesting, but only incidentally so; or it may turn out to be
downright worthless. In and of itself, intention provides neither the
necessary nor the sufficient condition for meaning. Moreover, since it
is a composite of motivations, overt and covert, the significant level of
intention may well evade what explicit documentation can record or
preserve.

U

ltimately, the notion that Durer or Michelangelo or Titian
can fully and unequivocally explicate to us the depth and
range of their intent is a belief in a kind of mental telepathy
that transcends time and mortality. The marvel in receiving as much as
we do from a great work of art is a marvel that sustains itself and does
not require a mysticism of absolute documentation to legitimate it.
This is a hard lesson to learn, for it marks the point of transition out of
the safe refuge of information on to wild seas in search of understanding. However we come by it, understanding of great works of art is an
adventure as arduous as it is worth undertaking; for it still remains one
of the few means at our disposal for sensitizing human beings and for
humanizing the world.
In the last century, in an effort to savor a richer marrow of meaning,
one often worried a peculiar kind of bone known as "the moral pur-

Figure 6. Giotto, Funeral of St. Francis (Bardi Chapel, Santa Croce, Florence). Current restoration.
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poses of art. " In this century we have been chewing perhaps higher,
perhaps lower, on the hog, and the name of the grinding and gnawing
is psychoanalysis. An historians have not always taken kindly to
Freud's Leonardo or Ernest Jones's Andrea del Sarto. In fairness, it
does not suffice to show that a given psychiatrist is merely mistaken as
to the facts. The hard case will come-and it is not beyond the human
potential-with the psychiatrist who is sensitive to a work of an and
sufficiently knowledgeable in its history to know what he is talking
about. In this event, we will have to ask whether a painting can be
psychoanalyzed and whether the result, if persuasive, is something
other than autonomous poetry.
If the person only can be psychoanalyzed through what he has left
behind him, then the question is: how relevant is a detail about a dead
man's psyche to the work before us? It is one more instance of the
general question: what is the significance of a biographical datum to a
work of art? Suppose a psychiatrist does establish that an artist long
dead was homosexual; or an astrologer that he was born when Sagittarius wept in the horned corner of a cold house; or a marriage
counselor that the artist's themes are such as men are prone to who
have been married three times and not twice. It is important that we
not haggle over the facts, for the issue in every case, and in any case, is
the same. In the work of art directly before us, what appreciates or
deteriorates in value now that we have this information? This question
must be spoken to directly, before we can be distracted from the complex and exhausting claims that the work already makes upon our attention. "An artist's work and his private life," writes Vincent Van
Gogh, "are like a woman in childbirth and her baby. You may look at
her child, but you may not lift her chemise to see if it is
bloodstained.''
No doubt a psychiatrist is wise who looks to Shakespeare, Rembrandt, and Mozart for guidance through the intricacies and the
depths of the human psyche. He could hardly choose wiser mentors. A
sensitive psychiatry should have much to learn from an. But that
studies in psychoanalysis yield something fundamental to the comprehension of a given work of art is still a consummation to be wished
for. The realization of this hope, one suspects, will have to be built on
fundamental grounds, on the disciplines of an epistemology encompassing wider terrain than psychoanalysis, anthropology, and an
history-separately or in conjuction-now seem able to offer.

A

for the older mode of authority that stresses moral purpose,
one is bound to observe that the visual intellect satisfies
itself shamelessly and with little regard for how the moral
intelligence reflects upon the worthiness of what is visually presented.
(Visual intellect and moral intelligence have been at variance often
enough in the history of art.) Ideally, both are satisfied in the best of
all possible minds concerned with the best of all possible experience.
Yet a visual intellect that capitulates too readily to moral stricture is
simply not strong enough to sustain its own gratifications. Moreover,
granted the relevance of the one to the other, to confuse the two is a
naked madness. One's erotic experience, such as it may be-actual or
fantasized, sordid or ideal-is involved relevantly in a confrontation
Published by SURFACE, 1981
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with a Titian, a Courbet, or a Rubens nude. But to confuse a painted
nude with a real one calls for compassion and immediate professional
care.
That painted nudes in remarkably provocative postures are
displayed with equanimity in museums where it would be unseemly
for real ones so to behave is only trivially explained by statements
about double standards of decency in life and art, or about the history
of what is or is not acceptable in institutional custom. At the heart of
the matter is the singular yet reasonable autonomy of the visual intellect. If the observer indulges, as perhaps he will, other gratifications
as well, this is very much his own affair. (And one hopes that he will
keep it so, at least until he is sure that he can speak of it with sensitivity and without circumlocution.) Obviously, as distinct from one
another as life and art may be, the experience from the one spills over
to the other. But it should also be obvious that, however closely
related, the two are not to be confused. If life and art are identical,
one of them is unnecessary.
It remains to add one last, and harshly realistic, caution. Intuitively,
we impose a law of significance, holding that ideas and emotions are
being expressed whose meaning and momentousness we proceed to
debate. But thought and emotion are characteristics unique to
biologically living things. There is still no locatable meaning in asking
of a mountain or a molecule what it thinks or feels . A painting or a
piece of sculpture is a thing, an inanimate object. Literally it can express nothing at all.
Our hope is that as something a human once made, it may constitute a record, a vehicle, a code, a configuration, a means of some
kind for evoking or provoking out of another human a complex of
worthwhile ideas and emotions. The language to be employed without
apology is the language of metaphor and reification. It seems better to
recognize the barriers of language and to challenge them than to persist in the delusion that there are infallible formulas on hand for
humanizing objects or for verbalizing what is visual. Indeterminacy
has its disciplines. A controlled inaccuracy implicit in metaphor and
reification is sufficiently offset, one can hope, by the insights which
such devices of language can display. The inanimate thing, the living
human passion, the visual presence, the verbal translation-one does
the best one can in bringing them together.

I

n a sense, the continuing confusion of life and art arise naturally,
so strong and urgent is the relationship between the two. The
temptation is deep and ever present to maintain expectations
from the one which only the other can reasonably satisfy. Nevertheless
it is an error to prejudge a son on the accomplishments of his father, to
subsume the meaning of a poem within the confines of the alchemical
text that helped sire some of its imagery, to value a fresco for the
religious belief that may have led an artist to undertake it, or to suppose that the true meaning of the work of art has been found when we
acquire information about the secret places in the artist's psyche where
presumably the work was conceived. In such an interpretation,
Genesis becomes not simply the first, but the only book in the Bible.
The genetic fallacy seems a conditioned reflex of the mind, an aberra-
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tion incident upon the human search for causes.
It is one thing to insist upon the relevance of life to art. But it is
quite another to legislate that art obey the conventions and conveniences of life. Grand pianos do not have to be comfortable to sleep
in. Yet a painting or a piece of sculpture sometimes still arouses a certain subcutaneous irritation, the suspicion of a put-on mainly because
one does not instantly find in it what, in reference to common experience, one would call a real and recognizable object. On this
criterion, two hundred cans of Campbell's soup ought to satisfy; they
are objects of common experience, real and recognizable. Uncritical
applications to art from morality, sociology, or psychoananysis involve
what Whitehead calls a "discrepancy of perspective." The cure for
it-and he is no doubt right about this-is recourse to "practical good
sense." But unfortunately common sense is one of the more uncommon of commodities. Ultimately, despite error and confusion growing
out of uncritical and simple-minded transferences from one to the
other, life and human experience remain unavoidable reference points
for an understanding of art.
Where else is one to look? The notion that the meaning of a work of
art can be located totally within itself is unfortunately trivial. If it leads
anywhere it is usually to a sterile hang-up over form. The work of art
within itself, and in its own terms, can yield data-invaluable data, to
be sure. But data as such, whether the field be sociology, physics or
art, cannot constitute the criteria for self-evaluation. The word sign is
the first part of the word significance. A datum derived through form
analysis acquires significance as a sign for something other than itself.
The work of art, as a thing in itself, can only be. But it too acquires
significance when it serves as a sign for what lies beyond it. (This is the
basis for the search for its symbol power, for its symbolic function.)
What lies outside its objective self, its "thingness," is life experience
from which it emanates, to which it refers itself back for the acquisition of meaning, and within which it must function in its effort to
achieve and sustain importance.
In brief, we assume a vital connection between art and human experience. We deny, however, any simple-minded correspondence between art on the one hand, and history, morals, or psychoanalysis on
the other. We assume that the role of form analysis is critical in
locating data essential in a search for meaning. We deny, however,
that such data are, or can be, in themselves the meaning.
Art provides us with visual images. So does nature. The difference is
that art, as the word itself says, is artificial. It purveys manmade and,
thus far, handmade images. A sunset is often beautiful, moving, an
event rich and complex in the feelings and ideas that it may arouse in a
sensitive observer. Yet the bedrock reason why the sunset is not a work
of art is that it is not a manmade contrivance. It is a form of bad poetry
(fortunately now firmly out of fashion) as well as a downright
foolishness to speak of nature as a great artist and to point to a sunset
as confirmation. It is more true and more humanly consoling to
recognize that much that is not art is fortunately still beautiful.

W

hat, then, is the relationship between the meanings of
images given in nature, or in the conventions of social life,
and the meanings of such images in man-made representa-
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tions? It is tempting to say that one carries over to the other, for so
often this is true. On the face of it, there is nothing improbable in the
notion that the experience of sunsets, of long shadows in late afternoon, of gray mornings, may form for an artist the meanings he seems
intuitively to associate with color, with light and shade . But the meanings of a natural image are complex and by no means constant,
although some meanings are surprisingly widespread.
A mountain, for example, may represent a haven to an outlaw, the
drift of continents to a geologist, and a challenge to an inveterate
climber. In a myth, it may be where a dark god sits and considers
modes of mysterious mischief. But in common experience, bounded as
we are by the measure of our own mortality, a mountain serves us as a
simple and triumphant symbol, if not of immortality, at least of the
imperviously enduring. It is the undefeated . This connotation, which
it has pervasively in life, is often the one that it evidently has in a
painting.
One of the links, then , between life and art is that often the common meaning of an image in human experience is also its evident
meaning in a work of art. Eyes and fingers are sensitive and exposed
parts of the human anatomy. Common experience testifies that they
are critical centers of human pain. In his Guernica, Picasso relies upon
the immediate transference of such knowledge from life to art. What
it means for a city to be destroyed in an air raid is plain enough from
the disjunct, unfocused eyes, from the distended, stuffed fingers.
In the case of the mountain, or of dislocations of certain parts of the
human anatomy, the transference of connotation from life to art simply occurs. That humans are prone to make such obvious transferences
is a fact that does not bear arguing about. (I have encountered the
cheerful soul who sees the Guernica as a well-designed wall decoration. Some tolerate well the air raids that happen in other places .)
Yet many things commonly encountered in life do not so readily
and unequivocally declare themselves. The color red, for example, has
too wide-ranging and dissimilar a set of meanings in common life for
us to predict the meaning of its appearance in a painting. Moreover,
unlike shattered eyes, the color red in a painting has no necessary and
inevitable connection with some of its common connotations in life (a
traffic signal, a red-light district, a political ideology, a state of embarrassment). Sometimes a signal given in a work of art will trigger off in
an observer the same reaction (in essence) that such a signal would set
off in life . But sometimes, plainly, this is not expected to happen. The
representation of a red stoplight in a painting, for example, cannot be
counted on to stop a motorist who has already gotten his car that far
into a museum.
Since we live commonly and continually with images in our contacts
with nature, in our social life, in our daily obligation to communicate
by sign or by sentence, we come to the images of art with an accrual of
meaning already accomplished and conditioned. We cannot impugn
manifest transferences of meaning when the images of art resemble
images imprinted upon us both by the exceptional and by the routinely repeated occasions of existence. Yet the relationship between art
and human experience cannot be reduced to a single direction,
without loss of significant enrichment. For art is itself a human experience. And to those to whom it is each day necessary, the imagery
of art becomes eventually in itself a special reserve of human
https://surface.syr.edu/suscholar/vol2/iss1/6
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knowledge. From it we draw a subtlety of nuance and intonation to
bestow upon the images that surround us.

T

o render an exterior seeming, that which impinges literally
upon the senses, is an early stage in the apprenticeship to art.
Increasingly one learns to see what one paints or carves, to
understand what one writes, to hear what one composes. A distortion
that one learns to see as one acquires mastery over the making of it
becomes an image of understanding which the visual intellect, turning
away from the canvas, is now trained to detect in the appearance of
real things. The faces, the hands, the human bodies everywhere
around us, betray nuances of character and of human condition which
a Giotto, a Rembrandt, or a Picasso have taught us to perceive. A
mind touched by Cezanne, Constable, Monet, Corot, sees trees and
rain and rock in a special syntax which the grammar of no other kind
of experience can entirely convey.
It is a pity that this must sound so precious, so much a stance of sensibility. But a mind governed solely by the formal mechanisms of
meaning is simply shut out from the rich potehtials that lie within the
images of common experience.

A Demanding

Grace
Photo by Ellen Jaffe
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It winds up being almost effortless
But not easy. The avid clench of bud
Might be a balance of petals we should
See as the rose's highest happiness;
Perhaps that discipline's its fondest care,
And it's with resignation, not relief,
It finally surrenders a single leaf
Upon the savage fecklessness of air.
But flower it must, and you and I too,
At high, sheer places in our clumsy hearts:
The brink and the breach where poise seems mere chance,
And there's absolutely nothing to do
But scramble up from our crouch and then start
To reel arrogant and headlong into dance.
-Mary Beth Ross
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